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FEDERAL COURTS-REMOVAL JurusnICTION-CouNTERCLAIM AS THB SoLE
BAsrs FOR REMOVAL-Plaintiff brought an action for damages in a state court
Defendant filed pleas to the declaration, and also filed a counterclaim arising
out of the same cause of action. On this date defendant also filed a motion
·with the Federal District Court asking removal of the case based solely upon
his counterclaim. On plaintiff's motion, held, case remanded to the state court.
Defendant has no right under the United States Judicial Code to have a case

1950]
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removed from the state court to the federal court when his motion is based upon
his own counterclaim.1 Collins v. Faucett~ (D.C. Fla. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 254.
The Judicial Code, prior to the 1948 revision, allowed removal of a case
from a state court to a federal court by the following provision: "•.• when in
any suit . . • there shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of
different States, and which can be fully determined as between them, then
either one or more of the defendants actually interested in such controversy may
remove said suit ••.."2 Under this rule the federal courts were in conllict as
to whether a defendant might remove a case when his motion was based upon
his own counterclaim.3 Courts allowing removal reasoned that the counterclaim
should be construed as part of the "controversy" between the parties and therefore should be included in determining whether the defendant might remove.4
The language of the Code in reference to removal was changed by the 1948
revision, and it is now provided: "(a) ... any civil action brought in a State
court ••• may be removed by the defendant or the defendants ...; (c) whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable
claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed • . • .''5 The significant changes in language are the use of the word "joined" and the omission
of the word "controversy.'' A problem arises as to whether the word "joined"
refers only to a joinder of claims by the plaintiff or is broad enough to include
the use of cross-claims and counterclaims.0 Professor Moore suggests that removal under the revised code is limited to the situation ·where there has been
a joinder of claims by the plaintiff.7 This construction seems sound, especially
in view of the reviser's comment that the revision should limit the volume of
1 The principal case was confined to a discussion of removal based upon a counterclaim and the other requirements for removal were not considered. Consequently, this note
will proceed on the assumption that such requirements have been met.
2 36 Stat. L. 1094 (1911), 28 U.S.C.A. (1940) § 71. This provision substantially
follows the 1887-1888 Judiciary Act. 25 Stat. L. 433 (1888).
3 "It is true also that there has been, particularly among the older cases, much conflict
and confusion on this question; so much so that many of the opinions refer to the conflict."
Haney v. Wilcheck, (D.C. Va. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 345 at 349. Refusing removal: McKown
v. Kansas & T. Coal Co., (C.C. Ark. 1901) 105 F. 657; LaMontagne v. T. W. Harvey
Lumber Co., (C. C. Wis. 1891) 44 F. 645. Allowing removal: Lee v. Continental Ins. Co.,
(C.C. Utah 1896) 74 F. 424. The defendant in the principal case argued that the majority view prior to revision allowed removal, but the court expressed no opinion on the
point as it felt that it was not necessary to the decision.
4 This was particularly true when the counterclaim was one that had to be entered
under a compulsory counterclaim statute. Lee v. Continental Insurance Co., supra note 3.
II 62 Stat. L. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. (1950) § 1441. A general discussion of the
change in the code may be found in 44 ILL. L. REv. 401 (1949).
o The broader use of the term "joined" to include a case where a defendant has set up
a counterclaim is illustrated in an article by Professor Blume, "Required Joinder of Claims,"
45 MicH. L. REv. 797 (1947). In this article the writer discussed the situations in which
joinder of claims is or may be required, and among such groupings of claims were counterclaim. See also, Professor Blume's discussion of the maximum affirmative scope of a civil
action, 42 Mi:cH. L. REv. 262 et seq. (1943).
7 MooRB, CoMl\iENTARY ON THI! U.S. JtmrCIAL CoDE 252 (1949).
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federal litigation.8 On principle alone, it would seem that a defendant having
a claim of a nature which could be prosecuted as a separate cause of action in
the federal court, but who elects to enter it as a counterclaim in the state court,
has invoked the jurisdiction of the state court and should not be allowed to remove the entire case to the federal courts. When the defendant returns to the
Florida state court, however, l,i~ may be faced with a pleading dilemma. If he
dismisses his counterclaim and brings it as a separate claim in a federal court,
that court may refuse to hear the claim on the ground that it had to be entered
as a compulsory counterclaim in the state court.9 Res judicata would then serve
as a bar to the claim in either the state or federal court. On the other hand, by
continuing to plead his counterclaim in the state court, the result of the principal
case prevents the removal of the entire case and the defendant is inv.oluntarily
deprived of federal adjudication of his admittedly federal claim. It is submitted,
however, that the likelihood of the federal courts' refusing jurisdiction to the
defendant's claim when brought as a separate cause of action i~ remote.10 The
court in the principal case remanded solely on the reasoning that the revisers
of the code knew of the conllict on this question under the prior removal statute
and if they had intended to give a right to remove to the defendant they would
have done so explicitly. Although the ultimate decision rendered by the court
appears to be the correct one, it would seem far better to reach that result by
looking at the actual changes made in the ~tatute rather than to what was not
included therein.
Paul M. D. Harrison~ S.Ed..
8 The reviser's note to §1441 may be found in 28 U.S.C.A. 2 (1950). Some doubt has
been expressed as to whether the revision in truth restricted removal. See, Strichter, "Some
Observations on the New Federal Removal Statute," 16 INs. CoUN. J. 103 (1949);
33 M1NN. L. REv. 738 (1949). These articles based·their conclusions primarily on two federal cases: Bentley v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., (D.C. Tex. 1948) 81 F. Supp.
323; Buckholt v. Dow Chemical Co., (D.C. Tex. 1948) 81 F. Supp. 463. The Bentley
decision has since been overruled by Bentley v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.,
(5th Cir. 1949) 174 F (2d) 788, and the Buckholt case relied on the decision of the district court in the Bentley case. It is questionable, therefore, whether the criticism of the two
articles is still valid. Butler Mfg. Co. v. Wallace & Tieman $ales, (D.C. Mo. 1949) 82
F. Supp. 635 indicates some limitation on removal under the revised code.
9 Florida has such a statute. Fla. Stat. Ann. (Harrison-West, 1943) §52.11. See
CLARK, Com! PLEADING 646 (1947) for citation of other states with similar statutes.
10 The difficult pleading position in which the defendant would be placed is probably
the strongest argument against the refusal to give jurisdiction. As yet, there does not
appear to be a decision on the point of whether a federal court would refuse jurisdiction
in this situation. In Red Top Trucking Corp. v. Seaboard Freight Line, (D.C. N.Y. 1940)
35 F. Supp. 740, the court refused to enjoin action in a state court on a claim which arose
out of the same transaction as the claim sued upon in the federal court and therefore should
have been entered as a counterclaim under the federal rules. The case was considered con,
trolling in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Quality Foods, Inc., (D.C. Tenn. 1948) 8 F.R.D.
359. The court in Campbell v. Ashler, 320 Mass. 475, 70 N.E. (2d) 302 (1946), was
confronted with the question of whether a person could sue in the state court on a claim
which should have been presented 2;5 a compulsory counterclaim in the federal court. However, no direct decision on the point was rendered as the court held that the plaintiff in
the state action was suing in a different capacity from that in which he was being sued in
the federal court.

